



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**A LOOK AT THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. ARMY PARTICIPATION
IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE**

BY

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A Look at the Evolution of U.S. Army Participation in Security Assistance

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ABSTRACT

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The intent of this paper is to document the evolution of security assistance within the United States Army. I envision the results of this effort would provide an initial basis to place informational items of historical significance on the security assistance charts within the greater project known as the United States Army Force Management School "Mother of All Charts". To accomplish this I must identify the following: the origins of security assistance, the various types of programs under the overarching label of security assistance, any major events or legislative bills strongly influencing security assistance, some of the nations involved in the larger programs, and the commanders of the United States Army Security Assistance Command.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----------|
| ABSTRACT | iii |
| PREFACE | vii |
| LIST OF TABLES | ix |
| A LOOK AT THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. ARMY PARTICIPATION IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE..... | 1 |
| DEFINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE | 1 |
| FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING (FMT)..... | 2 |
| EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES (EDA)..... | 3 |
| FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS)..... | 3 |
| FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING (FMF)..... | 4 |
| THE BEGINNINGS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE..... | 5 |
| SPREADING BEYOND EUROPE..... | 7 |
| THE 1950'S | 8 |
| FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT (FAA) OF 1961 | 9 |
| THE U.S. ARMY SCHOOL OF THE AMERICA'S (SOA) | 10 |
| The Beginning..... | 10 |
| Curriculum and Controversy | 11 |
| Relocation | 12 |
| SOA Wrap-up | 12 |
| THE ARMY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM STUDY REPORT (TASAPS-77)..... | 13 |
| U.S. ARMY SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMMAND (USASAC)..... | 14 |
| IRAN..... | 16 |
| SAUDI ARABIA..... | 18 |
| ISRAEL AND EGYPT | 18 |
| SOUTHEAST ASIA..... | 20 |

| | |
|---|----|
| THE COMMUNIST THREAT | 20 |
| FINDING POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE EARLY 60'S..... | 21 |
| THE FIGHTING MACV | 22 |
| PART OF THE LEGACY..... | 22 |
| END OF THE COLD WAR BRINGS NEW AREAS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE | 23 |
| GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN DEMINING..... | 23 |
| PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS..... | 24 |
| SUPPORT FOR EMERGING DEMOCRACIES | 24 |
| UNITED STATES REGIONAL CINC'S..... | 25 |
| CONCLUSION..... | 26 |
| ENDNOTES | 29 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY..... | 31 |

PREFACE

This paper looks at the evolution of the United States Army's involvement in the field of Security Assistance. I will identify the roots, define the various types of programs that have been administered under the overarching term of security assistance, discuss the major events and legislation that shaped security assistance as a tool of national strategy, document major security assistance efforts by the Army, and identify some of the key players. This paper will not stretch to the point of identifying the volume of resources the Army has spent in participating within the security assistance arena. Nor will this paper begin to explore the complex and numerous bureaucratic processes that have been instituted over the years to account, track, schedule, or program security assistance. In many regions of the world the magnitude and complexity of the United States security assistance was or remains too great to completely capture and document in this effort. In such cases I attempt to capture the highpoint events. The absence of recognition toward a particular event, individual, or group should not be taken as a lack of importance. I started this effort extremely naïve of the complexity of the subject area and without any background in security assistance matters. The goal was to complete the graduation requirement while simultaneously making a contribution, albeit a limited initial basis, toward populating the Security Assistance function of the United States Army's Force Management School's "Mother of All Charts". I also had a third goal of obtaining a sufficient understanding of security assistance to better prepare myself for potential assignments such as Defense Attache duty. The product, educational value, or any contribution to the "Mother of All Charts" would not be as thorough or as beneficial if it were not for the patient and professional approach of my Project Advisor, Dr. Richard Winslow. I greatly appreciate Dr. Winslow for sharing his subject matter expertise and providing a pathway toward success.

LIST OF TABLES

| | |
|---------------|-----------------------------|
| TABLE 1 | USASAC COMMANDING GENERAL'S |
|---------------|-----------------------------|

A LOOK AT THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. ARMY PARTICIPATION IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE

DEFINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Security Assistance is the current term for a set of programs that emerged over the past 50 years to assist in the implementation of the United States National Security Strategy by providing resources to foreign governments. The benefactors of these programs are intended to be both the United States and the particular foreign government receiving the assistance. Security assistance is a joint effort between the Department of State (DoS), lead agency by law, and the Department of Defense (DoD), assisted in a limited role by the Department of Commerce and Department of Treasury, and typically presented and defended before Congress by both DoS and DoD. The DoD specifically manages the military assistance portion of security assistance. The programs within military security assistance are in fact instruments of United States foreign policy and yet administered, executed, manned, and serviced by manpower resources from the military services (Department of Army, Department of Air Force, and Department of Navy), members of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) (previously known as Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)), and a large assortment of other players and organizations within the Department of Defense. Based on the current Joint structure, the four regional United States CINC's are responsible for security assistance programs within their defined areas of responsibility. The service departments are resource providers and implementing agencies that execute roles and functions as defined in DoD Directives.

There are 4 major categories of security assistance programs that have held prominence through the years. Within these programs there are numerous sub-categories and one-off events but by and large the bulk of Army participation through the years can be placed into one of these categories: Foreign Military Training (FMT), Excess Defense Articles (EDA), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). In addition, there are emerging categories of security assistance that may endure for long periods into the future and although they are somewhat in infancy compared to the others, they are worthy of mention and some discussion. These new programs include Peacekeeping Operations, Demining, and programs supporting emerging democracies will be addressed in the End of the Cold War section.

FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING (FMT)

Within the category of FMT there are a multitude of methodologies to accomplish security assistance objectives. Training programs supporting security assistance might be distinguished via location (within the continental United States, overseas either in the recipient nation or in another country) or by method of training delivery (attendance in schools, mobile training teams (MTT), technical assistance field teams (TAFT), etc...). There are at least three funding programs in place to support FMT: International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF).

Looking a little deeper into the training program, and in particular IMET, the fundamental tenet behind the concept is making a positive impact on the foreign individual(s) receiving the training. The idea is to make what amounts to a small investment in the grand scheme of nations that will ultimately lead to a much greater return to the United States by enhancing the individual participants' ability to make an impact in their native countries. This investment in providing foreign students with exposure to the American military and its training may produce a small more immediate impact, as in the next coalition, or a return that could have a significant influence on a nation as an individual assumes greater responsibility or authority within their nation. IMET provides training to improve professionalism within foreign militaries. The individual being trained, especially those traveling to the United States to receive such training, is expected to gain an insight into the United States democratic form of government and civilian control of the military. By exposing these foreign officers to the professional military environment of TRADOC service schools, our core ideals can take seed and the Army can build professional military-to-military contacts with potential key foreign leaders at a crucial period in their professional development. These personnel will be able to make better use of U.S. military equipment and gain an appreciation for American society.

This is a well thought of and supported part of the overall security assistance program that has been on-going for a long period of time. Walt Slocombe, a recent Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated during congressional testimony that "IMET is perhaps our most cost effective security assistance program."¹ He was echoing many other senior leaders who also support the development of military-to-military relationships with future foreign leaders, the enhancement of foreign military professionalism and competence, improving coalition interoperability with our doctrine and equipment, and exposing future foreign leaders to our values.

IMET is not limited to TRADOC schoolhouse instruction but also includes orientation tours within the United States for key foreign officials and training by U.S. military teams inside the foreign country, known as MTT or TAFT.

In 1991, Congress included foreign personnel other than from the Defense element for inclusion within the IMET program. Foreign Ministry personnel are now be included in what was identified as the new Expanded IMET. Foreign legislators were included in 1992 and in 1995 foreign civilians in non-governmental organizations became the latest addition. The Expanded IMET builds on the military-to-military contact concept and expands it to civilian leadership.

EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES (EDA)

EDA attempts to capitalize on the overwhelming ability of the United States industrial base delivering equipment that was either over purchased or no longer needed for utilization by the United States. When military equipment production or inventory exceeds the needs of the force, then it can be made available to allies and friends on a grant basis. Such actions can be done to enhance international friendships, promote regional stability, or bring potential allies and coalition members to common interoperability standards. A consequence of the program is the development of a new economic market for spare parts and logistics services.

The roots of EDA begin with the demobilization of U.S. forces following the conclusion of WWII. The second large influx of EDA came about as a result of significant technology leaps as we began to modernize our forces. Although the EDA program no longer provides the volume of equipment it once did, there are still significant examples of EDA transfers. The Kingdom of Jordan was a recent recipient of this type of security assistance.

Historically, this program provides a means for us to support less wealthy countries and allows them to leverage limited defense budgets yet improve their military capability without overburdening our national treasure or theirs.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS)

FMS constitutes a government-to-government sale of equipment and services, to include by products such as spare parts, maintenance support, training manuals, and can include training. Through authority given by the CG, Army Material Command (AMC), the Army Executive Agent for Security Assistance, the United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) is the Army's focal point for FMS, which is the Army's principal security assistance program.²

FMS is frequently misunderstood as being arms sales but in reality it's much broader and encompasses the numerous associated components noted above as well as defense items other than arms. FMS also includes medical equipment, supplies, and services (known as Class VIII). The U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency (USAMMA) is the responsible Army command to administer all Class VIII security assistance. To put this in perspective of overall Army security assistance effort I offer 2 benchmarks from 1998. Of 4700 open FMS cases USAMMA was working only 54 cases or 1.14%, which represented \$86 million of \$48 billion or .17% of the Army total, a fairly insignificant monetary slice but a part of Army security assistance.³

Two resource notes are worthwhile for inclusion in the description of FMS. The first being that a surcharge is attached to all FMS transactions for the purpose of providing funding to DoD security assistance organizations. The 2.5% (was 3%) surcharge or administrative fee funds DSCA headquarters staff, the security assistance function of the military departments, and security assistance personnel deployed in the unified commands and overseas. All of these security assistance functions and personnel are resourced from the 2.5% FMS surcharge plus the approximately \$22-24 million the Congress appropriates.⁴

FMS are conducted for a number of reasons associated with our national security, not the least is it's economic impact on the U.S. economy and in particular the defense industry where FMS has a tremendously positive affect. There is a positive effect, not just on the corporations and their employees, but the U.S. Army benefits as well from lower unit costs. This increased production lowers the cost per item for those items still procured by U.S. forces. In addition, a healthy robust defense industry can afford to invest in research and development activities that keep the U.S. defense industrial base at the leading edge of technology.

FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING (FMF)

Previously known as FMS Credit, this program was best viewed as a transition program to move the community from the grant aid policies of the 1950's to the FMS objectives that blossomed in the 1960's. FMF provides resources from the U.S. government that are utilized by the receiving country to procure U.S. military items, services, spare parts, and training. The program is basically U.S. generated dollars to generate FMS, either as a loan credit or gratis. The program became less relevant as the U.S. moved into the 1960's and through the 1970's due to the shift from grant aid to FMS. However, it received a major long-term revitalization in 1979 with the signing of the Camp David Accords.

THE BEGINNINGS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

What we would now call a very small military version of security assistance, yet a large political statement, was actually part of the birth of the United States. I am referring to the assistance given to the American Revolutionary force by the government of France. Examples of one nation supporting another (or a revolution) during the time of conflict can be found throughout the ages. So when did we as a nation begin exercising security assistance?

A small form of security assistance was exercised when we sent 3 military advisors to Korea as early as the 1880's. This is the first known establishment of a U.S. Military Assistance Group (MAG). Closer to home and a few years later during the early part of the 20th century, the U.S. provided military missions to numerous countries within Latin America to facilitate the earliest efforts of hemispheric security.

Although, not officially government sponsored, there is actually a contract version that predates the 1880's Korea effort in Egypt. The Egyptian government, which sought military expertise in the post U.S. civil war era (circa 1869), looked to unemployed U.S. officers with civil war experience to act as advisers. This was not a government-to-government form of security assistance but independent military consultation to the Egyptian government, contract assistance. 120 years later we would see very similar actions by the Croatian government in hiring U.S. military expertise to train and prepare forces for battle in the Balkans region.

Prior to the United States entry into World War I, specifically the 1914-1917 timeframe, and during a time the United States had declared neutrality, the United States became a large exporter of war materiel. The sale of arms and munitions to Europe during this timeframe exceeded \$2 billion, and the year of 1916 alone accounted for over \$1 billion. This export effort and the United States involvement in the International Arms Trade became a significant topic of national debate for the next 15-20 years.⁵ The debate included the creation of a Senate Munitions Investigating Committee, chaired by Senator Nye of North Dakota and known as the Nye Committee. The committee caused the creation of a Munitions Control Board and increased government oversight of the arms industry. I hesitate to label this World War I arms and munitions sales activity as security assistance. However, one can clearly see that in the future sales of this nature would become a part of the foreign policy discussion and wrapped into the government orchestrated security assistance program.

I propose there are numerous examples through our first 175 years as a nation that are similar and represent security assistance as an instrument of foreign policy and intended to support U.S. national security interests. But as we look at the magnitude and scope of security

assistance we have grown accustomed to implementing, the real roots of this rest in WWII and the immediate aftermath. Security assistance, as it has evolved in the U.S Army today, has roots in a 1941 wartime environment as well as what was known in 1947 as a peacetime environment. Years later we would come to understand the 1947 environment not as peace but the early stages of a different kind of war, one known as the Cold War.

The President Roosevelt backed Lend Lease program of 1941 would ultimately become the start of providing military equipment, in significant quantities, to foreign nations. The concept was to mobilize the massive, and geographically secure, industrial capability of the American homeland to equip the Allied forces. The equipment would originally be provided on a credit basis and not as a sales transaction. This was on a scale beyond anything the world had witnessed previously. This effort literally was supplying equipment for the Free World to engage in a monumental task against the Axis powers. Lend Lease equipment went to England, Russia, China, and in 1942 even Latin America received up to \$400 million worth. By the end of the war the costs for Lend Lease were in the neighborhood of \$45 billion.⁶ The China commitment of Lend Lease extended well past the United States participation in WWII and included the placement of a MAG in China in February 1946.

As the United States emerged from WWII, it found itself in a new Superpower status and was confronted with major challenges and opportunities to influence the world. The United States had now ventured to the continent of Europe twice within the previous 30 years and now possibly had the might, stature, and economic power to perhaps begin to shape and guide the world toward a new peace and prosperity that would preclude a 3rd military engagement. One thing for sure was that war-ravaged Europe needed to be rebuilt and develop a new economy. The Marshall Plan, espoused by George C. Marshall in a June 5, 1947 speech at Harvard University and adopted by the U.S. Congress, laid the groundwork for a grandiose post-war European economic assistance program. It was with this post WWII foundation that the United States began adopting a clear realization that what happens in Europe will ultimately have an effect on the security posture of the United States. As the political thought of the day began to view the USSR as a physical and ideological threat to the United States, world peace, and democracy, so emerged a U.S. position to contain such aggression.

The Truman Doctrine, delivered by President Truman in a March 1947 speech, laid the framework for the United States to utilize its bountiful resources and its new massive defense industrial capacity toward national security objectives. The Truman Doctrine called for United States engagement throughout the world, to contain communism at its current borders, and to

militarily strengthen the nations of the free world. The guiding principle was that no country should be allowed to fall into communist hands without an effort to prevent such a loss. The first flashpoint became the internal communist insurgencies within Greece. At the same time there was also concern over the Soviet communist proximity to the poorly defended borders of a weaker Turkey. Using the United States Army as a means to introduce assistance we created a Military Attache and Assistance Group (MAAG) within each country and began providing military aid. With funding in place via the Greek-Turkish Aid Act of 1947, thus began the birth of a peacetime security assistance program that would span the globe. To this day, Greece and Turkey are held as two success stories in the security assistance business.

However, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1949 is the most critical piece of legislation in terms to starting a long-term, multi-nation, peacetime based security assistance program. This was Congress' first attempt to articulate U.S. security aid, specifically military aid, in peacetime non-emergency terms. The legislation established a fairly robust U.S. military assistance program stressing European security. The European region received approximately 60% of the military aid in the initial 7 years. Subsequent MDAA's passed in 1951 and 1954 without major changes in the primary focus. NATO members would be supported with military aid to ensure a meaningful deterrent against Soviet aggression was in place. The 1954 MDAA version also gave the President the legal authority to administer a foreign assistance program. The President went on to delegate the authority to the DoS and the DoD, specifically for the military assistance portion.

We now have seen the beginnings of the United States using security assistance to play not to an individual country or problem but to influence the world stage and set the conditions to exercise a Superpower role. The key events at this beginning point are the Lend Lease program (use of the capacity within the industrial complex), the Truman Doctrine of using military security assistance to halt any communist (note this is not limited to Soviet) aggression, establishment of MAAG's in Turkey and Greece, and the initial Congressional legislation (MDAA of 1949) authorizing and funding the peacetime program.

SPREADING BEYOND EUROPE

Ironically, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, Far East, who did not always see eye-to-eye with Harry Truman may have been the one individual most responsible for establishing a large and enduring security assistance relationship with Japan. Shortly after the beginning of the Korean War, General MacArthur encouraged the

Japanese to form a "National Police Reserve (NPR)"⁷ and thus reverse the total disarmament imposed at the end of WWII. He dispatched a letter to the Japanese Prime Minister and on the same day began security assistance support to the Japanese in the form of training and equipping the NPR. It was not until 1954 the sponsoring organization was re-designated as the MAAG – Japan (MAAG-J), housed personnel from each of the 3 service departments, and worked to further U.S. policy by coordinating security assistance for Japan by implementing the MDAA of 1954. MAAG-J reorganized to the Mutual Defense Assistance Office and reduced in size significantly as a result of a maturity assessment of the now named Japanese Self Defense Force. Through the years security assistance efforts with Japan included IMET, FMS, and because of Japan's technological achievements, they are partners in technical information exchanges (for the Army this includes wheeled and tracked vehicles and artillery) and cooperative research and development programs established in the 1990's. A Master Data Exchange Agreement signed in 1962 provides the basis for the technical exchanges. Security assistance was at the foundation of growing and arming what in 2002 is defined as our most important Asian ally.

THE 1950'S

Most of the early military assistance following WWII took the form of grant-aid, i.e. resources provided without a required dollar reimbursement. This was especially true of those countries facing the emerging Soviet threat. But physical geography was not the only driver when selecting recipient nations of grant-aid. Many assistance programs were designed, integrating both economic and military assistance, to bolster a nation that was on the verge of economic collapse and thus loomed as a possible communist takeover target.

During this period FMS were of little significance when compared to the value of grant-aid. To place this in perspective, in the early 50's, grant-aid averaged \$8.7 billion annually to 50 countries while FMS generated a value of only \$350 million on an annual basis.⁸ A primary driver of this statistic was the lack of fiscal means by many countries emerging from WWII to put financial resources toward the purchase of U.S. military equipment, or for that matter any military equipment. European, more specifically NATO, countries were probably the first to recover and be able to make expenditures on their collective security. This recovery would lead to philosophical, political, and security assistance changes.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT (FAA) OF 1961

FMS remained small scale till mid-1961. Western Europe's recovery had taken hold and the Europeans were able to carry more of the cost of their defense effort. Technology was beginning to take hold in the free world and opportunities for an operationally significant jump forward from the WWII equipment was imminent within the arms and defense industries. The U.S. defense industry sought to broaden the customer base and sell to a growing international market. To obtain this customer the industry faced new competition from a growing Western European defense industrial community. Encouraging Western European expenditure toward FMS also offered a financial offset to the large expenditures in Europe by the United States and the U.S. forces as part of forward stationing in Europe. Politically and economically this was a wise direction to pursue - reduce grant military aid and increase FMS. By 1966 the transition was complete and the dollar volume of FMS surpassed the grant-aid totals.⁹ The emphasis was now firmly placed on the concept of sales, whether that be military equipment, spare parts, co-production, etc... The basis for all this was the first major congressional revision of legislation governing military assistance since WWII. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 played a tremendous role in mapping and setting the conditions for this change from aid to sales. The act acknowledged the role, supervision and general direction of the executive branch in executing military assistance programs. The act went on to designate the Department of Defense as maintaining primary responsibility for military assistance to foreign nations and international organizations. Congress had multiple objectives in this legislation to include: support foreign policy by promoting peace and collective security throughout the world, enhancement of U.S. national security by deterring communism and defeating communist supported aggression, and the general welfare of the United States. The act specifically prohibited military assistance on a grant basis to economic developed countries, i.e. Western Europe, thus encouraging the sale of military equipment vice grant-aid and further pushed the idea of co-operative efforts. The co-operative efforts were intended to push for a more rapid social and economic development among the allies.

The DoD FMS program for the years 1962-1966 reached a cumulative total of \$11 billion and fulfilled the intent of congress, 80% of this total was driven by NATO Europe and Canada.¹⁰ In addition to the value contained within the pure monetary sum, important facilitators for the future developed via Cooperative Logistics Support Arrangements, co-production agreements such as the M113 vehicle production arrangement with Italy, and Cooperative Research and

Development agreements such as the work done jointly by the United States and Federal Republic of Germany for the development of a new medium tank. Business, specifically the defense business, was becoming an international game. Co-production created a true international arms market and international business relationships. America was at the technological and academic lead of the game and providing a stimulus for the emerging globalization phenomena that would hit the world in the coming years. The services cannot take credit for driving all this but they played a role. Responsibilities in the successful execution of FMS emerged as the purview of the services. Such responsibilities included contracting, production, delivery, technical assistance, training support, and follow-up support. The key legislation worth noting here is the FAA of 1961.

The impact of the FAA of 1961 by the mid 70's was substantial. The grant-aid program was reduced to an annual outlay of approximately \$1 billion, with a corresponding drop in number of recipients, down to 26 countries. FMS at this time was generating nearly \$10 billion per year.¹¹

THE U.S. ARMY SCHOOL OF THE AMERICA'S (SOA)

The Beginning

This is a good place to break from the heavy focus on equipment and FMS and look at one of the most valued security assistance programs in the SOUTHCOM region. Any discussion of Security Assistance and the U.S. Army would be incomplete without a discussion of the SOA. The educational institution has been a significant part of IMET and security assistance for Latin America for over 50 years. The strengthening of military-to-military relationships and educational opportunities to exchange ideas and understanding has been a tremendous assist to developing inter-American friendships. The United States, and in particular USSOUTHCOM, has been very successful in the pursuit of U.S objectives in Latin America. The SOA deserves fair credit for its contribution in keeping communism out and helping democratic forms of government begin to take hold where military juntas where once the norm.

Like many other aspects of current security assistance, the SOA can trace its beginnings to actions from the WWII era. In the 1930's German, Italian, and French military missions dominated the Latin American region. As a direct result of the 1936 Buenos Aires Inter-American Conference and the Declaration of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation, Latin

American countries began to cancel their arrangements with European countries and replace them with similar arrangements and missions from the United States. With United States presence in-place throughout the region (by 1941) and the introduction of Lend-Lease equipment it soon became very apparent that military training was needed.

Initially (1943-1945) Latin American military personnel attended U.S. Army schools established in the Panama Canal Zone. The Latin American Training Center (re-designated later as the Latin American Ground School) opened at Fort Amador in December 1946 and coordinated the increasing number of Latin American students attending a variety of U.S. military schools in the Panama Canal Zone.¹² On 1 February 1949 (some articles say 1946), the U.S. Army Caribbean (USARCARIB) School was created and consolidated all U.S. Army schools within the Panama Canal Zone. Instruction continued to be primarily for U.S. Army forces; however, at this point Spanish based instruction began to infiltrate the curriculum at the request of various Latin American countries. In 1949, the ratio of U.S. to Latin American students was 3:1. By 1954 the majority of the students were Spanish speakers. U.S. Army forces and training requirements in Panama continued to decline and by 1956 it was determined all instruction would be in Spanish. The title U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA) was adopted in 1963 to better reflect the hemispheric wide student population.

Curriculum and Controversy

Through the years the school conducted a variety of courses training at various levels, to include individual and small unit skills, middle level command and staff processes for military leaders, as well as higher level joint operations. Early instruction included significant (half the course load at times) effort put toward developing skills that supported nation-building and economic growth.

In 1961, President Kennedy's administration, fearing Communism and in particular Castro's effort to export guerilla activities throughout Latin America, took steps to change the curriculum to develop skills pertinent in fighting communist-sponsored guerilla insurgents. A new course, the Counter Guerilla Operations Course, was an addition to the USARCARIB. Veteran Newsman Jules Dubois noted in 1964, "the impact of USSOUTHCOM on the Latin American military both frightened and angered the Communists...the successful training which the Latin American (military) men were receiving at the counterinsurgency school in the Canal Zone... erected a most impenetrable roadblock in the forward march of the Communists' plans to quickly take over Latin America...."¹³

However, the SOA role in this has been controversial. Latin American governments have historically been led by military authorities and fail to respect the concept of civilian control of the military, only recently have we seen this changed. A military coup was too often the norm vice a peaceful transfer of civilian power. This was troubling to many in the United States as we were training military (and paramilitary) personnel of Latin America who were subsequently returning and utilizing law enforcement and intelligence procedures against their civilian population. The Harrington Amendment, addition of Section 660, to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, eliminated military police and military intelligence courses from the SOA curriculum in the mid 1970's.

Relocation

The school saw some changes in the late 70's as it merged, in 1976, with the U.S. Security Assistance Office (SAO) in Panama to create the U.S. Security Assistance Agency Latin America (USASAALA). The new organization was a Field Operating Agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, HQDA but was commanded by the local CG, 193rd Infantry Brigade. As part of the 1977 Carter-Torrijos Panama Canal Treaty (implemented in 1979) the United States retained the authority to continue training Latin American personnel for five years unless other agreements could be reached. Negotiations were conducted to find options on keeping SOA intact within Panama but no conclusions could be satisfactorily reached before it was necessary for the United States to act. On 21 September 1984, then commandant COL Michael J. Sierra closed the school. On 24 October 1984, the Department of the Army announced it would reopen the SOA at Fort Benning, GA. The school, under the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, officially reopened on 18 December 1984.

SOA Wrap-up

As more SOA alumni ascended to positions of authority and power within their countries not all the results were as positive as the IMET program goals envisioned. The 1980's brought more controversy as the SOA was accused of fostering the continuation of military government structures and human rights abuses. The accusations were not always true but the perception was the United States was expending security assistance funds to train and develop personnel who were later becoming leaders of their Armed Forces and their country (while still in uniform) and were wrongly using their power to combat domestic opposition. In a nutshell, they were failing to implement democratic principles.

This open criticism, while not totally justified, did provide positive impetus for new curriculum changes. The six-week Democratic Sustainment Course, first offered in 1996, is an attempt to go beyond military training and support democratic, civil-military, and humanitarian objectives. This course is being taught to both military and civilian personnel. The new course shows a positive linkage between the U.S. Army efforts, the National Security interests and objectives, and USCINCSOUTH regional objectives.

The SOA certainly has a positive story to tell and deserves substantial credit for its contribution to security assistance as well as United States interests and Latin American regional security. Mike McCurry, White House Press Secretary, stated on 1 Aug 97, "In the last decade, Latin America has changed dramatically from a region dominated by coups and military governments to one of democracy and civilian control."¹⁴ There is no doubt that SOA had a significant part in enabling this democratic shift. The SOA continues today as a strong institution conducting classes in Spanish to Latin American as well as U.S. personnel.

THE ARMY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM STUDY REPORT (TASAPS-77)

In 1977, the Army conducted a major large-scale study of its role and processes in the security assistance field. The resulting report, TASAPS-77, contained a number of comments regarding Army security assistance and recommendations that were all approved for implementation by the Vice Chief of Staff, Army. Key points and outcomes from the study include:

The report acknowledged the Army's role in executing security assistance to support U.S. foreign policy.

It further notes these programs were beyond the basic mission of maintaining the Army and constituted an additional mission area. The study documented 1540 military and 4106 civilian personnel committed to security assistance programs.

The VCSA approved the establishment of CG, DARCOM (now Army Materiel Command) as the Executive Agent for security assistance within the Army. (This Executive Agent designation did not change the fact that then, nor today, does he command the many varied Army commands that have a role in security assistance.)

It further documented the value of training foreign military personnel via Mobile Training Teams (MTT) and attendance at U.S. Army schools as the most effective means of building military-to-military relationships and developing contacts with potential leaders of allied nations.

The VCSA approved the re-designation of U.S. Army International Logistics Command (USAILCOM) as the US Army Security Assistance Center.

U.S. ARMY SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMMAND (USASAC)

USASAC was originally established in 1965, at New Cumberland, PA as the United States Army Supply and Maintenance Command International Logistics Center. The center was designated in May 1966 as the U.S. Army International Logistics Command (USAILCOM) and the command was renamed in 1975 to USASAC. The organization remained a Major Subordinate Command of AMC (and its predecessor DARCOM) throughout its existence. USASAC now operates from a Headquarters in Alexandria, VA while maintaining a logistics-operating center at the old USAILCOM location in New Cumberland, PA. In addition to the HQ and New Cumberland operations, the CG oversees an operating center in Saudi Arabia known as Program Manager Saudi Arabia National Guard (PM-SANG). The Saudi Arabian operation is completely funded by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by means of FMS. Large FMS programs like PM-SANG, to the extent of the 3% surcharge, makes U.S. Army expenditures (manpower authorization and cost excluded) toward security assistance a reimbursable expense and relieves the U.S. taxpayer of this expense.

USASAC maintains responsibility for life-cycle management of FMS, manages the EDA program, co-production agreements with foreign governments (both negotiation and implementation), and export licenses for the U.S. Army. Worldwide co-production agreements totaled 31 in 2000. Co-production appeals to foreign countries for economic reasons as well as access to the transfer of technology. The U.S. Army benefits from the increased standardization and interoperability. Depending on the national relationship (such as that with South Korea) USASAC can also support items obtained through direct commercial sales and war reserve stock for allies (WRSA).

USASAC is the backbone to the U.S. Army's proper execution of its security assistance roles and functions. As such, the Commanding General's that have led USASAC and the predecessor USAILCOM deserve identification and are noted next under:

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Arrive</u> | <u>Depart</u> |
|---|---------------|---------------|
| Major General Bruce K. Scott | Oct 1999 | Present |
| Major General Larry G. Smith | Aug 1997 | Oct 1999 |
| Major General Michael S. Davison Jr. | Jun 1994 | Aug 1997 |
| Major General William A. Fitzgerald Jr. | Jul 1992 | Jun 1994 |
| Major General Raymond E. Haddock | Jan 1991 | Jun 1992 |
| Major General Thomas G. Lightner | Jun 1988 | Jan 1991 |
| Brigadier General Walter W. Kastenmayer | Jan 1988 | Jun 1988 |
| Major General Thomas W. Kelly | Aug 1987 | Jan 1988 |
| Brigadier General Harry D. Walker | Jul 1986 | Aug 1987 |
| Major General Edward C. O'Connor | Aug 1983 | Jun 1986 |
| Major General Claude M. Kicklighter | Nov 1981 | July 1983 |
| Major General Thomas F. Healy | Sep 1980 | Oct 1981 |
| Major General John R.D. Cleland | Jul 1979 | Aug 1980 |
| Major General Tom H. Brain | Oct 1976 | Mar 1979 |
| Major General Joseph E. Fix III | Jul 1973 | Sep 1976 |
| Major General Wallace C. Magathan | Mar 1972 | June 1973 |
| Major General Arthur W. Kogstad | Jul 1970 | Jan 1972 |
| Major General Michael E. Leeper | Oct 1969 | Mar 1970 |
| Major General Robert C. Forbes | Sep 1968 | Aug 1969 |
| Major General Thomas H. Lipscomb | Sep 1967 | Jul 1968 |
| Major General John M. Finn | Oct 1965 | Aug 1967 |

TABLE 1. USASAC Commanding General's

THE MIDDLE EAST

With the mention of PM SANG in the above section, this seems like a good place to expand on security assistance to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East more broadly. The security assistance history in the Middle East is dramatically different from the large, successful, and enduring programs in direct support of NATO countries and our European allies. For the most part European security assistance was focused on the primary threat of deterring Soviet communism. The Middle East has some of that flavor in the early years of security assistance to Iran, but a closer look brings other issues to light: lack of democratic forms of government, the continuing Arab-Israeli dispute, and the lack of a central security organization like NATO. Rather than one common theme, in the Middle East, I can see three major security assistance themes develop: deter the spread of communism into Iran, promote peace and regional security, and build alliances to protect the global flow of oil. In each of the themes and in many countries within the Middle East, Army equipment and advisors were key and thus the Army played a significant role, if not in the policy development certainly in the execution phase.

IRAN

Given the tense past twenty years of the United States-Iran relationship, it may seem hard for many people to appreciate that Iran was for a long time on the receiving end of one of the largest U.S. security assistance programs. Geographically located just south of the Soviet Union, Iran had been designated a key part of the national security strategy and Soviet containment (keep the Soviet Union from the warm water access of the Persian Gulf) since the end of WWII. Every President, from Truman to Carter, concluded that such support was in the U.S. national interest. For the U.S. Army, this meant in-country advisors and large sales of helicopters, artillery, and missiles. President Carter would have a truly different challenge concerning Iran in the last year of his administration.

The U.S. provided political support to Iran as far back as 1946 in response to Soviet actions over Azerbaijan. U.S. military assistance actually began to flow in 1955 as a result of Iranian entry in Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). CENTO might have at one time been thought of as having NATO-like potential in providing collective security from the Soviet threat but it became insignificant shortly after its creation. It wasn't long afterwards the military assistance program to Iran began a rapid expansion. On 1 July 1962, the U.S. entered into a long-term military assistance arrangement with the Iranians, in particular our friend the Shah of Iran. The Iranians began large purchases, using significant oil revenues, which fit right into the

objectives of the recent FAA of 1961 legislation. Remember the change in thought regarding FMS vice grant-aid (or credit) and the balance of trade concerns. Although the collective defense value of CENTO never materialized, the Soviet threat remained in clear view. Consequently, the Iran program sustained itself and grew. The program received support from key leaders such as Secretary of Defense McNamara, who in 1964 Congressional testimony, stated the purpose of the Iran program was "to help build up its military forces to the point where they can insure internal security and provide at least an initial defense against Soviet attack."¹⁵ The program in Iran grew to over 800 FMS cases by 1972 and the economics of this effort was extremely positive for the U.S. defense industry.¹⁶ From 1972-1976, Iran purchased \$10.4 billion worth of military equipment, the largest single nation purchaser.¹⁷ Eventually the Nixon (and Ford) Administration was accused of letting this go too far and that arms transfers were being overly relied on to achieve a balance of payments. It became ever more apparent that the Iranian view of security needs was the dominating factor. Iran's aggressive military posture began to strike fear within the region. The concept of arms sales was coming under attack from an increasing vocal American (not just due to Iran but also resulting from the Vietnam experience) population. Academic, religious, and the media circles were beginning calls for constraint on military assistance and a conversion to economic based assistance programs.

In 1976, as President Carter wins office he is also advocating a significant reduction in arms exports and looks for a more peaceful world by lessening the access to military armaments and a more open focus on human rights issues. Congress is on board and they also are looking for less reliance on military sales in the balance of trade. Adding to the Iranian challenge facing President Carter, Congress passed an Amendment to promote the cause of human rights. Shortly thereafter Congress held hearings specifically on human rights in Iran. The Shah of Iran and his government did not maintain the best record in terms of human rights. His internal security and special police unit, known as SAVAK, was accused of pervasive injustices. During this whole period we had a substantial U.S. Joint MAAG operating out of Tehran, Iran.

Security assistance to Iran had begun to taper off prior to 1979 but the conclusion was abrupt in that it ended with the February 1979 hostage taking at the American Embassy in Tehran.

Over twenty years later, there are still 505 security assistance cases in dispute at the Iran Tribunal in the Netherlands. The USASAC continues to dedicate a few personnel, on a fulltime basis, to support the U.S. efforts in the legal proceedings.

SAUDI ARABIA

Security assistance with Saudi Arabia is massive even when compared to their Persian Gulf neighbor Iran. In 2000, Saudi Arabia was the largest purchaser of FMS through USASAC with much of this effort focused on sustainment and modernization. Today the Saudi Arabian FMS is entirely funded from the Saudi Arabian treasury.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) relationship with Saudi Arabia started as far back as 1951.¹⁸ The Engineer Assistance Agreement of 1965 placed the U.S. Army in a position to provide Engineer services to support the entire Saudi Arabian military construction program. This was an FMS relationship managed by the USACE, with assistance from USILCOM (later USASAC), and the oversight by Department of Army staff offices. As the 1970's approached the USACE were literally viewed and utilized as the Saudi Arabian government supervision for all military-related construction programs. This security assistance program assumed a powerful role and influence within the host nation government. And why not, Saudi Arabia had the money to build and the USACE was capable. The Saudi Arabian building effort wasn't just about spending money, they in fact feared for their national sovereignty and the protection of their monetary lifeline, the east coast oil fields. Consequently they didn't stop at the engineer assistance.

In 1973 a memorandum of understanding between the Saudi Arabian Royal family and the United States was signed as a direct result of Saudi Arabian concern for the protection of their oil resources which were becoming ever more crucial to sustain the world economy. The multi-billion dollar SANG Modernization effort was born. This program remains today as it was in the beginning, a Saudi Arabian funded family of FMS. As such it has become a critical part of the long-term DoD defense strategy in the USCENTCOM theater.

To put this in perspective in regards to financial implications, in 1990 there was an outstanding FMS bill to the Saudi government for \$24 billion. The plan called for a reduction in the outstanding bill to \$10 billion by the end of 1997. To achieve this the Saudi minister of finance pledged to make monthly deposits of \$3.5 billion.¹⁹ The Saudi Arabian security assistance effort continues at significant levels today.

ISRAEL AND EGYPT

During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and 1973 Yom Kippur War the U.S. provided substantial military assistance to Israel. While neither of these constituted our first involvement with Israel

or the Middle East, it certainly put the United States in a sensitive Middle East predicament and it raised the fiscal level of FMF resources being applied. The United States began to use security assistance as a means to support, not the containment of communism, but the security and existence of the state of Israel, a matter of U.S. national policy.

This effort took on a whole new significance with the 26 March 1979 signing of the Camp David Accords, by Israeli Prime Minister Begin, Egyptian President Sadat, and President Carter. The accords provided the framework to document a commitment to Middle East peace on the part of both nations and provide the impetus for future agreements. (Under this framework at least 8 separate accords were signed within the following 18 months.) While the original accords did have some key agreements and stipulations, such as the return of the Sinai to Egypt, the accords also provided for military arrangements to assure the territorial security of both Israel and Egypt. This provision subsequently led to Executive and Congressional branch action on the part of the United States that began an extremely large and enduring security assistance effort.

The accords have led to massive amounts of U.S. security assistance, military assistance in the form of FMF requested by multiple administrations and appropriated from Congress. For over 20 years and continuing, approximately \$1.8 billion has gone to Israel and \$1.3 billion has been provided for Egypt as the United States commitment agreed to in the accords. Israel retains a quantitative edge in dollars as well as a qualitative advantage in regards to equipment. The Camp David Accords publicly places the national leadership of Egypt and Israel on a new plateau in the stride for peace. One nation previously committed to the destruction of the other and one living in constant threat of survival from its many Arab neighbors, now had made a public commitment to live peacefully in the region and more important to work toward the expansion of peace throughout the region to include addressing the Palestinian problem. While the massive amounts of security assistance funded the security commitments in the accords, the reality was this security assistance bought the U.S. government a short term insurance policy against regional conflict that was intended to be parlayed into lasting regional peace and a solution for the Israeli foreign policy challenge. The Palestinian problem still exists today. But Egypt and Israel have not fought another war since the 1979 accords. Jordan also receives security assistance as a result of their commitments and role at the Camp David accords but on a substantially smaller scale than either Egypt or Israel. Jordan has been a recipient of both military and economic assistance from the U.S. since 1952.

From a U.S. defense industry standpoint it probably couldn't come at a better time. Shortly after we had lost tremendous defense industry revenues from the Iranian FMS programs and tremendous rhetoric regarding a reduction in arms sales, the U.S. government created a new \$3 billion annual revenue source by both Egypt and Israel required to spend their FMF dollars in the U.S.

Egypt became eligible to receive FMS as a result of a 1 August 1977 Presidential decision.²⁰ This decision kept the Russians out of Egypt and facilitated an opportunity for the United States to take the lead in trying to resolve the Middle East conflict, at least between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. As a result of the Camp David Accords the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC), Cairo, Egypt has grown to one of the largest overseas offices in the security assistance area. The OMC Cairo office is routinely led by a U.S. Army General Officer. Other significant Army involvement includes introduction of the Hawk Air Defense missile system, the Apache helicopter, and an M1 Tank Co-production program.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE COMMUNIST THREAT

Trying to document United States security assistance in Southeast Asia is worthy of a study in and of itself. The cause is almost entirely based on fear of both Soviet and Chinese communist aggression into Southeast Asia. The United States has a string of strong, stable, and non-communist allies as we look at the island nations of Asia – Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. The mainland of Southeast Asia presents a different picture and the fear is that one nation falling to communism will cause others to follow – popularly known as the Domino Theory. To prevent the possibility of the Domino Theory becoming a reality, the U.S. government begins an aggressive posture of providing economic and military security assistance to Southeast Asian countries. In 1950 we begin our military assistance programs with Thailand, a security assistance program that has continued for over 50 years. The South Vietnamese requested U.S. military assistance as early as 1954. And in 1956 we begin the first military security assistance deliveries to Laos.²¹ These were certainly unique in that the deliveries went to multiple forces within one nation state - the government, the neutral forces, and the conservative forces. The one common goal among all the parties being to keep the Pathet Lao communists from taking control of Laos. The U.S. had a second goal of

protecting our positions in Vietnam and Thailand by providing a more secure and non-communist controlled flank.

The Vietnam security assistance era actually predated the 1954 Vietnamese government request. In 1950, the French who were deeply involved militarily in Vietnam, requested \$94 million in military assistance. The request, sent in February 1950, preceded the initiation of the Korean conflict and was not acted on till after the United States became militarily committed in the Korean War. The United States sent \$20-30 million in the initial response and more followed in 1951. In addition to the fiscal support the United States established a Military Assistance and Attache Group-Vietnam (MAAGV) in September 1950. The first commander of the MAAG was U.S. Army LTG John W. O'Daniel.²²

As the United States reached an armistice agreement in Korea the flow of economic and military assistance to Vietnam, the French effort in Vietnam, and the partners in the Southeast Asian regional security effort began to grow. The U.S. Congress accepted this increase of military assistance to address the Southeast Asia problem as an acceptable substitution to the positioning of U.S. combat forces in the region.

FINDING POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE EARLY 60'S

In the late 40's and 50's many Americans saw security assistance as a taxpayer giveaway to foreign governments. It was a program that the executive branch and the national security team relied on as a tool in both their foreign policy and national security efforts. This didn't always play well on Main Street USA so there was frequently a need to justify and find support. In early 1963, President Kennedy appointed GEN Lucius D. Clay to review and provide recommendations regarding security assistance. The committee reported out in 3 months and documented a position that supported the United States participating in properly administered security assistance programs. The programs were intended to provide a positive impact on the mutual defense of the United States and the recipient countries. The report also recognized the recent changes in the execution of FMS and the subsequent reduction in the balance of payments equation.²³ Labor Leader George Meany was part of the committee and wrote a dissenting opinion to the report. The dissent was not against security assistance but rather that the committee didn't push harder to fully fund security assistance programs as an insurance policy. Meany viewed security assistance as an insurance policy against the need for massive military expenditures, both in terms of monetary resources and American lives. The committee's positive report on the value of security assistance gave President Kennedy

increased backing for security assistance actions in support of foreign policy in Southeast Asia. I doubt George Meany could possibly envision the massive resource use, dollars and American lives, that President Kennedy was embarking on under the title of security assistance. The Kennedy administration, like many other administrations, was following the American strategy of communist containment.

THE FIGHTING MACV

In 1961 President Kennedy proposed the introduction of U.S. ground combat forces and by December 1961 he authorized the use of U.S. Army and Air Forces in Combat Operations. The number of U.S. forces in Vietnam was doubled in a very short time and a new 4-star command, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) was given full responsibility for military policy, operations, and assistance in Vietnam on 8 February 1962. MAAGV became a subordinate organization of the new MACV.²⁴ The first MACV Commander was GEN Paul D. Harkins. The newly established command began a multi-year build-up of combat strength. Perhaps one of the biggest lessons to come out of the conflict was the inappropriate execution of combat operations involving American troops under the command of a military assistance program. The MACV leadership did not have command authority over the host nation allied forces of South Vietnam. This is but another strategic strategy blunder to come out of the United States experience in Vietnam.

PART OF THE LEGACY

What followed Vietnam in regards to the sorting of Presidential and Congressional powers in foreign affairs and security assistance may be the most significant outcome in terms of security assistance. During the early to mid-70's, Congress wanted more say in foreign policy, and in light of the Vietnam experience, they were especially interested in U.S. security assistance and FMS. Consequently, the Congress passed (subsequently signed by President Ford) the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976. This was not purely a name change from the FAA of 1961, but rather it legislated greater Congressional control and oversight in U.S. security assistance activities. In particular, the foreign transfer of conventional arms and related equipment. The primary means of control being monetary floors set to trigger the administration to exercise Congressional notifications (known as the Section 36(b) process) of security assistance activities. In the same piece of legislation, Congress reversed an earlier Fulbright Amendment urging more government-to-

government sales vice direct commercial sales as pushed by the Fulbright Amendment. Ironically, the political landscape was such that as President Carter came into office in 1977, he shared their concern over the apparently previously unrestrained arms sales and had been advocating America as the "world's granary, not its arms supplier."²⁵ Presidential Directive 13 was released just 4 months after taking office and arms transfers were to be seen as an "exceptional foreign policy instrument" rather than the norm and annual ceilings (for weapons and weapons related defense items) were added to the equation. How ironic this is. Because despite the humanitarian, almost pacifist, rhetoric to control weapons and weapons related sales, President Carter may have created the largest part of U.S. security assistance for the next 30 years in the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. When President Reagan, later supported by President Bush, assumed office the stated policy was significantly altered and arms and defense equipment sales went from the exception to an essential element of foreign policy. In congressional testimony following Desert Storm significant credit is given to the security assistance role in building strong security relationships that were critical to the coalition and the security assistance infrastructure that supported rapid efforts during the crisis.

END OF THE COLD WAR BRINGS NEW AREAS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

There are also three relatively new areas of security assistance that although not historically significant at this point do need mentioning. Their entry into the security assistance arena clearly denotes a new form of military involvement in the implementation of foreign policy.

GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN DEMINING

Initiated in 1993 by President Clinton's Demining 2010 Initiative, the Demining program is intended to rid the world of landmines by the year 2010. The way to accomplish this goal is to assist individual nations create the capability to conduct demining operations. Demining representatives are on the staff of regional CINC's to coordinate efforts within their area of responsibility. Five years after the announcement the security assistance effort was engaged in 17 countries and operating on approximately \$50 million per year.²⁶

As of 2000, the following 24 countries²⁷ are in the Demining program:

| | | |
|--------------------|------------|------------|
| Afghanistan | Estonia | Mozambique |
| Angola | Ethiopia | Namibia |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | Guatemala | Nicaragua |
| Cambodia | Honduras | Rwanda |
| Chad | Jordan | Swaziland |
| Costa Rica | Laos | Thailand |
| Croatia | Lebanon | Yemen |
| Eritrea | Mauritania | Zimbabwe |

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Again the Camp David Accords come to the forefront, as it was that agreement that placed a Multi-national Force of Observers (MFO) in the Sinai as a Peacekeeping Operation. The MFO provided outsider presence and guidelines for separation of two previously warring nations, Egypt and Israel. Of greater international significance, this effort allowed the Middle East Peace process to advance with a new level of Arab recognition of Israel. A more recent example would be the Dayton Peace Accords that were signed as a precondition of the entry of Peacekeeping forces into Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this case the accords were intended to get the warring factions to support democratization of the country, abide by the rule-of-law, and to seek a new beginning with an acceptance of greater pluralism.

SUPPORT FOR EMERGING DEMOCRACIES

As a result of the anticipation of the end of the Cold War and the significant changes in Eastern Europe, the United States was looking to create and strengthen new democracies. In 1989 Congress passed the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act. The United States wanted to assist emerging democratic nations in Europe achieve stability, grow viable economies, and maintain their national security while promoting our national security interests in the East European region. In FY 2000 SEED assistance programs existed in the following countries:

| | | |
|--------------------|-----------|------------|
| Albania | FYROM | Poland |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | Hungary | Romania |
| Bulgaria | Latvia | Slovakia |
| Croatia | Lithuania | Yugoslavia |

Another Congressional Act with largely the same intent is the Freedom Support Act Assistance for the New Independent States (NIS). This act was to address the vital national interest of seeing that Russia and the NIS become stable and democratic nations. In FY 2000 the following countries received assistance under this program:

| | | |
|------------|------------|--------------|
| Armenia | Kazakhstan | Turkmenistan |
| Azerbaijan | Moldova | Ukraine |
| Belarus | Russia | Uzbekistan |
| Georgia | Tajikstan | |

With the same goals NATO and the U.S. military community in Europe formed the Partnership For Peace (PFP) program to establish new military-to-military relationships. In 1991, as a result of PFP, IMET broadened to include 30 new countries.²⁸ PFP opened a whole new part of the world to security assistance programs. Monetarily this is still a small program but the potential is tremendous. LTG Rhame says the most exciting aspect of his tenure as Dir, DSAA (now DSCA) was the security assistance effort put toward the development of countries in NATO's PFP program.²⁹ Looking strictly at the FMF funding part of security assistance, by 1997, PFP was but 2% of the contribution to Israel and Egypt.

Estonia is one example of the efforts on-going with PFP countries and is generally reflective of the program. Emerging from the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. the United States began providing security assistance to Estonia in 1992, a full-time SAO officer was assigned in-country in 1996. A Military Liaison Team under the Joint Contact Team Program is resident in-country and working alongside the evolving Estonian democratic government. Estonia sends cadets to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and participates in other IMET opportunities to include the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany. New equipment for the Estonian forces is provided by way of EDA and as a result of the Warsaw Initiative, FMS is executed thru FMF grant money.³⁰

UNITED STATES REGIONAL CINC'S

As theater engagement plans continue to be refined and executed, peacetime utilization of security assistance will remain a major asset in the prevention or shaping of a potential conflict. The CINC's security assistance programs can effectively translate to regional security, stability, and the building of stronger allies.

In 1977 there was a JCS observation concerning the complexity and increasing scale of security assistance programs. The observation predicted future programs would be a product of

a complex democratic process that is influenced by numerous factors both internal to government as well as external pressures such as the media, business lobbyists, human rights and environmental activists, and foreign actors who seek U.S. support, technology, equipment, advisors, etc... to work through their security problems. Congressionally legislated direction, executive branch initiatives, and military-to-military contact will add structure and complexity during this era of coalition warfare.³¹ They certainly were correct in their forecast.

As evidenced by the new security assistance programs earlier, security assistance will continue to evolve and remain a significant part of the regional CINC's assets. CINCEUCOM plays a role in working the Eastern European PFP programs. CINCCENTCOM oversees the efforts of the Office of Military Cooperation in Cairo, Egypt. Each regional CINC is responsible for directing the MAAG's within their area of responsibility.

The CINC's are not in this alone and look to the services for the accomplishment of specific roles. The Army's role includes processing of security assistance cases, execution of the FMS, MTT, or IMET, executor of co-production agreements, and as a manpower resource provider for security assistance offices such as SAO's, MAAG's, etc.

In addition to the CINC's direction regarding security assistance, security assistance is also a part of the U.S Ambassador's Embassy Mission Performance Plan. This plan is a guide that assists the ambassador, his country team, and the interagency supporting cast that should be working together with the regional CINC's staff to obtain the in-country goals.

The CINC's involvement in security assistance is absolutely critical. Security assistance programs transcend peace and war and may be the ultimate theater engagement tool available to CINC's.

CONCLUSION

Along with structure will come scrutiny because of the widespread belief that security assistance is a foreign giveaway of tax dollars. Yet as recent as 1999, only 1% of the federal government expenditures went toward security assistance and foreign affairs programs.³² The one constant that will remain is that although it may change shape, form, recipients, and level of effort, security assistance will remain a key tool of the U.S. government in the execution of national security strategy and ultimately for the purpose of assisting Americans to reside in a stable and safer world with a growing economy. If it doesn't, then we will have ceded our superpower status and no longer have the ways and means to act on the world stage.

Although it's not a primary mission of the Army, this is important business for the nation and sometimes the Army is the best service to act. A speech by the Secretary of Defense on 2 Apr 1998 provided high-level support for the continuation of security assistance where he states "(superpower status) requires us to have a strategic vision." He follows on with comments that strategic vision includes the proactive use of security assistance programs to shape and respond to the world situation.³³

LTG Davison, the Army DIR, DSAA, emphasized the critical overall importance of security assistance to U.S. foreign policy goals. He articulates a case that security assistance will continue to exist as long as we have a foreign policy and a complementary national security policy. One can see from the above that security assistance programs continue to evolve and change with the economic, military, political, and environmental situation that faces the U.S. leadership as it views the U.S. role in the world order. Evolving security assistance roles in activities as demining and peacekeeping are but an example of post Cold War foreign policy initiatives and political priorities.³⁴

Security assistance will always support our national security by the strengthening of defense forces and capabilities of our allies within the free world. Building military coalitions, better interoperability and inter-changeability of materiel, logistics, and training will ultimately enhance the strength the U.S. forces can bring to bear on a conflict. The U.S. Army has historically played an important role in the application of security assistance and this paper is but a beginning effort in telling and documenting a piece of the Army story.

WORD COUNT = 11,779

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²⁸ Slocombe, 57.

²⁹ Rhame, 38.

³⁰ Richard J. Anderson, "U.S. Security Assistance For Estonia," DISAM Journal 20, no. 3 (Spring 1998): 6.

³¹ Department of the Army, 34.

³² Madeline K. Albright and William Cohen, "Foreign Aid Fables: Don't Shortchange American Security," DISAM Journal 22, no. 2 (Winter 1999-2000): 61.

³³ William S. Cohen, "U.S. Must Remain Active in Post-Cold War Foreign Affairs," DISAM Journal 20, no. 4 (Summer 1998): 69.

³⁴ Rhame, 34.

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